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SYMPOSIUM

Commentary
LELAND

B. CROSS, JR.*

Without taking a position herself, Ms. Doerbng suggests that the
difficulties experienced by some negotiators with the dual obligation
arising from sections 3, 4, and 5 of the Indiana Teacher Bargaining Act'
may lead some commentators to advocate amending the Act to provide
for open scope bargaining or, at least, broadening the scope of bargaining over that presently provided.2 Another commentator in this sympo*B.A. 1952, Denison University; J.D. 1955, University oE Michigan; Partner, Ice
Miller Donadlo & Ryan, Indianapolis; Adjunct Professor, Indiana University School of
Law.
1 The Indiana Education Employment Relations Act, IND. CODE §§ 20-7.5-1-1 to -14
(1973), IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 28-4551 to -4564 (Supp. 1974) [hereinafter referred to as
P.L. 217 or the Act]. Sections of the Act referred to are fromi the session law, Pub. L.
No. 217, [1973] Ind. Acts 1080, as amended, Pub. L. No. 1, § 5, [1974] Ind. Acts 3.
2 Doering, Bargaining and Discussion-Is It a Happy Marriage?, 50 IND. L.. 284
(1975).
It is not unusual for state statutes on public employee collective bargaining to exclude
specific matters from the category of mandatory subjects of collective bargaining. See,
e.g., PA. STAT. ANY. tit. 43, § 1101.702 (Supp. 1974). For that matter, it is not unusual
for state statutes on public employee collective bargaining to forbid public employers
from bargaining collectively about certain listed subjects. See, .g., HAWAII REv. STAT. §
89-9(d) (Supp. 1974). The state statute on public employee collective bargaining in
Wisconsin provides both such restrictions. See Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 119.90, 111.91
(2) (a)-(b) (Supp. 1974). Some state public employee collective bargaining statutes
approach the matter by providing a statutory statement of management rights. For example, some provide that the public employer has the unconditional right to "maintain
the efficiency of governmental operations," e.g., HAWAII REv. STAT. § 89-9(d) (Supp.
1973); KAN, STAT. ANN. § 75-4326(d) (Supp. 1974); N.H. R:-v. STAT. ANN. § 98-C:7
(Supp. 1974) ; NEv. REv. STAT. § 288.150(2) (c) (1973). Others provide that the public
employer has no duty to bargain with respect to the "mission of the agency," e.g., VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 3, § 905(b) (1972); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 111,91(2)(a) (Supp. 1974).
Still others provide that the public employer has no duty to bargain on matters of "inherent managerial policy." See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 179.65(1) (Supp. 1974). Accordingly, the provisions of P.L. 217 which protect a school employer from deliberately
or inadvertently bargaining away historic or statutory rights of management are somewhat typical of the protections set forth in comparable statutes of other states.
Notwithstanding the above, as these comments are written there are bills pending in
the Indiana legislature which direct themselves to broadening the scope of bargaining
under Public Law 217. Two of these are S.B. 349 (Teague) (broadening the definition
of subjects of bargaining in section 4 to include salary, wages, hours "and all other terms
and conditions of employment," with terms and conditions of eaployment defined to inelude fringe benefits; procedures for the promotion, demotion, transfer, assignment, retention of employees; school calendar; class size; pupil-teacher ratio; curriculum development and revision; preparation time; extracurricular activiiles; student supervision,
discipline, and expulsion; and general working conditions; and striking out the specific
enumeration of school employer responsibilities and authorities in section 6(b)); and
H.B. 1432 (Harris) (broadening the definition of subjects of bargaining in section 4 to
include salary, wages, hours, salary and Wage related fringe benefits, and terms and
conditions of employment; and narrowing the definition of subjects of discussion in sec-
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sium, in fact, has taken that position.' Such a position does not seem
warranted.
One of the bases of this position is the observation that procedural
disputes took up an inordinate amount of time in the first year of experience under the Act.4 Whether such procedural disputes did so is
questionable. This may certainly have been the case in some instances;
in these it may well be that the delays were due to an overabundance of
caution by school boards and negotiators, the inexperience of negotiators, the vagaries of the new Act, or a combination of all of these. The
problems of procedural resolution were undoubtedly compounded by
at least one of the two prominent school employee organizations proposing a rather awesome "boilerplate" master contract 5 in almost all
school districts where it negotiated. This proposal included section 4
"bargainables," 6 section 5 "discussibles," 7 section 6(b) management
rights items, and even a few "illegals." '
tion 5 to delete wordng conditions, selection, assignment or promotion of personnel; student discipline; expulsion or supervision of students; pupil-teacher ratio; class size or
budget appropriations).
34 See Darko, Commentary, 50 IND. L.J. 314, 324 (1975).
See Doering, supra note 2, at 290, 304. Darko cites to Ms. Doering's observation in
his commentary, supra note 3, at 314. Neither author provides exact data to support the
observation.
5 Staff of the Indiana State Teachers Association, Proposed Master Contract Be] Association (1974) (un] School Corporation and the [
tween the [
published proposal on file with the INDIANA LAW JouRNAL).

This proposal, with ap-

pendices, frequently ran over 51 pages in length.
6 IND. CODE § 20-7.5-1-4 (1973), IND. ANN. STAT. § 28-4554 (Supp. 1974) lists the
items over which the parties must bargain.
7 ID.
CoDE § 20-7.5-1-5 (1973), IND. ANN. STAT. § 28-4555 (Supp. 1974) lists the
items which are discussible.
8 A common proposal was the following agency shop provision:
The Board shall deduct from the payroll of all certificated employees in the bargaining unit Who are not members of the Association, a representation fee
amounting to the dues of the association(s) and shall remit such fees to the
Association. Nothing contained herein shall be construed as forcing or inducing
anyone to become a member of any teacher organization.
Master Proposed Contract, sPra note 5, at 7. Such a provision is not specifically
authorized by the Act and is a violation of sections 7(a) and (b) which provide:
Sec. 7. Unfair Practices.
(a) It shall be an unfair practice for a school employer to:
(1) interfere with, restrain or coerce school employees in the exercise of
the rights guaranteed in Section 6 of this chapter.
(2) dominate, interfere or assist in the formation or administration of any
school employee organization or contribute financial or other support to it;
provided, that subject to rules and regulations made by the governing body, a
school employer may permit school employees to confer with the school employer
or with any school employee organization during working hours without loss of
time or pay;
(3) encourage or discourage membership in any school employee organization through discrimination in regard to hiring or tenure of employment or any
term or condition of employment;
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In response to this "boilerplate" proposal, some school board negotiating teams understandably tried first to negotiate an agenda of what the
parties agreed was "bargainable" and a separate agenda of what was
"discussible." Failing agreement on such an agenda, these teams proceeded by each making a unilateral determinatior on such questions.
Some of these teams went even further and tried to establish separate
teams to deal with each classification. These approaches may have been
motivated by a team's fear that a "discussible" item could be legally
(5) refuse to bargain collectively or discuss with an exclusive representative as required by any provisions of this chapter;
(6) fail or refuse to comply with any provision of thi; chapter.
(b) It shall be an unfair practice for a school employee organization or its
agents to:
(1) interfere with, restrain or coerce (a) school employees in the exercise
of the rights guaranteed by this chapter, or (b) a school employer in the selection of its representatives for the purpose of bargaining collectively, discussing
or adjusting grievances. This paragraph shall not impair the right of a school
employee organization to prescribe its own rules with resp ;ct to the acquisition
or retention of membership therein.

(2) cause or attempt to cause a school employer to di;criminate against an

employee in violation of subsection (a) ....
INn. CoDE §§ 20-7.5-1-7(a), (b) (1973), IND. ANx. STAT. §§ 28-4557(a), (b) (Supp.
1974).
The agency shop has been rejected in other states for a variety of reasons. A provision of the bargaining act which prohibits the employer from encouraging or discouraging membership in the union has been held to bar the employer's agreeing to implement
an agency shop. Smigel v. Southgate Community School Dist., 388 Mich. 531, 202
N.W.2d 305 (1972); In re Farrigan v. Helsby, 42 App. Div. 2d 265, 346 N.Y.S.2d 39
(1973). A provision in the bargaining act saving to employees .he right to refrain from
collective activities likewise can bar an agency shop agreement New Jersey Turnpike
Employees' Union, Local 194, AFTE v. New Jersey Turnpike Auth., 64 N.J. 579, 319
A.2d 224 (1974), affg 123 N.J. Super. 461, 303 A.2d 599 (1973). And if the agency
shop is not listed expressly as a permissible item of bargaining in the state's bargaining
act, it must be disallowed. Pennsylvania Lab. Rel. Bd. v. Temisters Union, Local 8,
Case No. PERA-C-1075-C (Pa. Lab. Rel. Bd., 1970) (unreported). Also, an agency
shop agreement has been held to conflict with the state's civil service laws, in that failure
to pay union dues or equivalent was not among the reasons given by law for dismissing
an employee. Foltz v. City of Dayton, 22 Misc. 27, 50 Ohio Op. 2d 384, 254 N.E.2d 395
(C.P. Montgomery County 1969), aff'd, 27 Ohio App. 2d 35, 6 Ohio Op. 2d 213, 272
N.E.2d 169 (1970); 35 Op. Ore. Att'y Gen. 824 (1971), reported in NEA NE.oTiATior
REsEARcir DIGEST, Mar. 1972, at 12.
Contra, Town of North Kingstown v. North Kingstown Teachers Ass'n, 110 RI.
698, 297 A.2d 342 (1972) (it would be inequitable for those who benefit from services of
the teachers' organization not to pay for them). See also Karcl-mar v. City of Worces, 301 N.E.2d 570 (1973); accord, Massachusetts Nurses Ass'n v.
Mass. ter, Mass. - , 306 A.2d 264 (1974).
Lynn Hosp., As these comments are written there are bills pending in the Indiana legislature
which direct themselves to legalizing the agency shop: e.g., S.B. 276 (Teague) (providing an amendment of section 4 which establishes a "fair-share agreement' as a subject
of bargaining and defining same as an arrangement whereby a contract may contain a
provision requiring employees in the bargaining unit to pay a proportionate share of the
cost of the collective bargaining process and contract administration measured by the
amount of dues uniformly required of all members of the excluive representative).
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converted to a "bargainable" by the team inadvertently straying over
the nebulous dividing line between section 4 and section 5. It may
have been feared that were this to happen, the negotiating team might
expose itself to a valid refusal-to-bargain unfair practice charge or, worse
yet, might end up with a discussible item being resolved by a fact-finder
under section 12(f) and section 13(c).' Regardless of motivation, these
techniques were in many cases unreasonably time-consuming and even
more unreasonably counterproductive.
These techniques were unnecessary. Experienced negotiators by
and large formally noted the legal and practical problems involved, made
a reservation-of-rights statement' ° and then negotiated in the broadest
sense of the word concerning both classes of subjects. In so doing they
proceeded much the same as experienced private sector negotiators have
for years with "mandatory" and "permissive" subjects' with no
reservation-of-rights statement and no significant procedural problems.
An interesting observation was made in this regard by the Aaron
Committee whose 1968 report was the basis of a public employee ordinance for Los Angeles County.' The report stated:
Experience has shown, however, that disputes over the duty to
negotiate are frequently more intractable than the substantive
issues involved, and that agreement is more readily reached on
the latter than on the former.' 8
9 Section

12(f) provides:
Nothing shall prevent either party from requesting mediation or fact-finding at
any time after such one hundred eighty (180) days on items which must be bargained collectively under Section 4 of this chapter, or prevent the parties acting
together to request mediation or fact-finding on any items which must be bargained collectively under Section 4 of this chapter.
IND. CODE § 20-7.5-1-12(f) (1973), IND. ANN. STAT. § 28-4562(f) (Supp. 1974).
Section 13(c) provides:
The school employer and the exclusive representative may also at any time
submit any issue in dispute to final and binding arbitration to an arbitrator appointed by the board. The award in any such arbitration shall constitute the
final contract between the parties with respect to such issue.
IND. CODE § 20-7.5-1-13(c) (1973), IND. ANN. STAT. § 28-4563(c) (Supp. 1974).
10 See Appendix infra at 337-38 for a reservation of rights statement used by several
negotiators.
". The distinction between the two types of subjects is definitively explored in Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 113 NLRB 1288, 36 LRRM 1439 (1955), enforced, 236
F.2d 898 (6th Cir. 1956), rev'd in part, 356 U.S. 342, remanded, 259 F.2d 270 (6th Cir.
1958).
12 B. Aaron, L. Bailer, & H. Block, An Employee Relations Ordinance for Los
Angeles County: Report and Recommendations of the Consultants' Committee, July 25,
1968 (unpublished report on file with the INDIANA LAW JOURNAL) [hereinafter cited as
L.A. Report]. The resulting ordinance appears in G.E.R.R. 51:1426-38 (Ref. File Feb.
18, 1974). For a discussion of this and other local government reports on public employee bargaining, see Smith, State and Local Advisory Reports on Public Employment
Labor Legislation: A Comparative Analysis, 67 MIcH. L. REv. 891 (1969).
13 L.A. Report, supra note 12, at 12.
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Such procedural questions are normal notwithstanding the approach to scope of bargaining under the statute in question. " The position of this commentator is that the probability of occurrence of procedural disputes is not tied to any particular form of public employee
statute nor to any particular concept of scope of bargaining. Such disputes are inherent in the process of collective bargaining concerning
jealously guarded governmental rights in what may be a largely
political arena. Moreover, statutory change by broadening the scope of
bargaining will not solve the procedural problem and could very well
lead to other problems to be hereinafter briefly noted.
Whatever inordinate amount of time was spent on procedural disputes was most likely the result of the negotiators' inexperience and their
insecurity about the new Act. Hopefully, time has largely obviated both
of these causative factors, and thus they now fail to provide a reason for
the Indiana General Assembly to seriously consider a change in the
scope of bargaining as provided in the Act.
There have been other arguments advanced for opening the scope
of bargaining in the public sector. One of these is that opening the scope
of bargaining brings the two parties to the table on a more "equal"
basis. In support of this position, Professor Edwards has advanced
the following general equality argument:
To promise the government employee equality at the bargaining
table while at the same time excluding most items relating to wages,
hours, and working conditions from the mandatory subjects of
bargaining would make collective bargaining for the public sector
an illusory gain indeed. 5
Professor Edwards' argument at most only partially applies to the
Indiana Act because section 4 presently makes the following items bargainable: "salary, wages, hours, and salary and wage related fringe
benefits." In any event, the Act gives no indication that the legislature
intended to bring the parties to the table as equals. It must be concluded that equality of the parties was not a goal sought by the Indiana
legislature.
Yet another reason advanced for opening the scope of bargaining
has been the illegality of strikes in the public sector. This has been
14See Smith, supra note 12, at 906-08.
25 Edwards, The Emerging Duty to Bargain in the Public Sector, 71 MicH. L. REv.
885, 908 (1973). See also National Labor Relations Act § 1, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1970).
Cf. H. WELLINGTON & R. WINTER, JR., THE UNIONS AND THE CITIES 13 (1971) [hereinafter cited as WELLINGTON & WINTER].
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urged as a rationale for giving the employee organization an offsetting
legal advantage as a "balance." The Michigan Employment Relations
Commission's decision in Westwood Community Schools 6 suggests an
alarming approach in this regard:
A balancing approach to bargaining may be more suited to the
realities of the public sector than the dichotomized scheme-mandatory and non-mandatory-used in the private sector. . ..

[The

private sector] scheme prohibits the use of economic weapons to
compel agreement to discuss non-mandatory subjects of bargaining,
but strikes are permissible once the point of impasse concerning
mandatory subjects of bargaining is reached. Economic force is
illegal in the public sector in Michigan.

.

. [Here,] economic

battle is to be replaced by invocation of the impasse resolution procedures of mediation and fact finding.
An expansion of the subjects about which the public employer
ought to bargain, unlike the private sector, should not result in a
corresponding increase in the use of economic force to resolve
impasses. In the absence of legal public sector strikes, our only
proper concern in the area of subjects of bargaining .is whether the
employer's management functions are being unduly restrained. All
bargaining has some limiting effect on an employer.
Therefore, we will not order bargaining in those cases where
the subjects are demonstrably within the core of entrepreneurial
control. Although such subjects may affect interests of employees,
we do not believe that such interests outweigh the right to manage.1 7
The Michigan commission thus suggests that the scope of bargaining
in the public sector ought to be broaderthan it is in the private sector.
It seems to be saying that because public employees are prohibited from
striking they should have the right to put any subject they want on the
bargaining table."8 This approach is unsound. To allow such a broad
scope of bargaining would make the agenda in negotiations unmanageable, would be contrary to the restrictions on delegation of discretion
under section 1 (d) of the Act, 9 and would be contrary to the section
16 Westwood Community Schools & Westwood Educ. Ass'n, [Unfair Practice] Case
No. C70 1-152 (Mich. Emp. Rel. Comm'n, June 3, 1971), 7 MERC Lab. Op. 313 (1972),
reprinted in R. SMITH, H. EDWARDS & R. CLARK, JR., LABoR RELATIoNs LAW IN THE
PUBLIC SECTOR:

CASES AND MATERIALS

397 (1974).

MERC Lab. Op. at 320-21; SMITH, EDWARDS & CLARiK at 401-02.
18 Plainly, it is illegal for any school employee, school employee organization, or an
affiliate thereof to strike in Indiana. Strikes are prohibited by section 14 of the Act,
IND. CODE § 20-7.5-1-14 (1973), IND. ANN. STAT. § 284564 (Supp. 1974).
29 Section 1(d) provides:
The relationship between school corporation employers and certificated school
employees is not comparable to the relation between private employers and employees among others for the following reasons: (i) a public school corporation
177
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6(b) preservation of the prerogatives of school employers.2" Moreover,
as a practical matter, such a broad scope would severely frustrate
bargaining and discussion by giving the school employees and school
employee organizations more subjects they could not strike to obtain,
thus proportionately minimizing the accomplishments the employee
organization can legally achieve and increasing the probability of illegal
strikes. The Michigan commission's suggestion of excluding from the
scope of bargaining only subjects which "unduly" restrain management
functions is patently argumentative and naive. For these reasons the
Westwood approach to bargaining scope is wholly unacceptable.
Yet another argument for broadening the scope of public employee
bargaining is that the collective bargaining process is therapeutic in
nature and therefore should be designed to cover any problem arising
in the bargaining relationship. Professor Edwards has observed in
this regard:
This [the therapeutic] is a more satisfactory approach, in terms of
achieving stable and harmonious labor relations, than to have the
employer refuse to discuss an issue in the first instance because
2
it is legally nonnegotiable. .
is not operated for profit but to insure the citizens of the state rights guaranteed
them by the Indiana State Constitution; (ii) the obligation to educate children
and the methods by which such education is effected will change rapidly with increasing technology, the needs of an advancing civilization and requirements
for substantial educational innovation; (iii) the Indiana General Assembly has
delegated the discretion to carry out this changing and innovative educational
function to the local governing bodies of school corporatiots, composed of citizens elected or appointed under applicable law, a delegatio;t which these bodies

may not and should not bargain away; and (iv) public school corporations have
different obligations with respect to certificated school employees under constitutional and statutory requirements than private employers have to their employees.
IND. CODE § 20-7.5-1-1(d) (1973), IND. ANN. STAT. § 28-4551(d) (Supp. 1974) (emphasis added).
20 Section 6(b) provides:
School employers shall have the responsibility and authority to manage and direct
in behalf of the public the operations and activities of the .chool corporation to
the full extent authorized by law. Such responsibility and activity shall include
but not be limited to the right of the school employer to:
(1) direct the work of its employees;
(2) establish policy;
(3) hire, promote, demote, transfer, assign and retain employees;
(4) suspend or discharge its employees in accordance with applicable law;
(5) maintain the efficiency of school operations;
(6) relieve its employees from duties because of lac: of work or other
legitimate reason;
(7) take actions necessary to carry out the mission of. the public schools as
provided by law.
IND. CODE § 20-7.5-1-6(b) (1973), IND. ANN. STAT. § 28-4556(b) (Supp. 1974).
21 Edwards, supra note 15, at 916.
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Professor Edwards' argument does not apply to the Act, since section 5
of the Act already makes discussible a broad range and long list of
subjects which are not subjects of bargaining, including "working conditions, other than those provided in Section 4. .. ."" It may be noted
that the therapeutic approach is even broader than that suggested by the
Michigan commission in the Westwood case because it has no limits at
all. In any event, there is grave doubt that the approach suggested will
provide the envisioned "therapy," for the reasons previously set forth
in discussing the Michigan commission's decision in Westwood. The
probability of such therapy is minimal, and the impact of such treatment on the rights of the public at large could be monumental for
reasons which will be hereafter discussed.
The advocates of a broadened scope of bargaining or open scope
bargaining rely 28 on the alleged successes of state labor boards or commissions to supply, on an ad hoc basis, definition and restrictions on
the scope of the duty to bargain. This confidence in such boards is not
wholly warranted. Ms. Doering notes that in 1974 in Indiana two
fact-finders found preparation time to be discussible rather than bargainable, and two other fact-finders found preparation time to be bargainable and thus offered recommendations on the subject.2 Ms. Doering
22 This list also includes "curriculum development and revision; textbook selection;
teaching methods; selection, assignment or promotion of personnel; student discipline;
expulsion or supervision of students; pupil-teacher ratio; class size or budget appropriations . . . ." IND. CODE § 20-7.5-1-5 (1973), IND. ANN. STAT. § 28-4555 (Supp. 1974).
23 The line between nonnegotiable management rights and subjects over which
certified employee organizations would have the right to negotiate under the
recommended ordinance is not always clearly discernible. We do not think it
would be wise to try to draw it, once and for all and for all subjects, in the
ordinance. Rather, we recommend that in close and doubtful cases the [proposed
enforcement] commission be empowered to draw the line on an ad hoc basis.
L.A. Report, supra note 12, at 11-12. Along the same line, Professor Edwards states:
Current developments in public sector labor laws indicate that we may expect to
see a widening of the scope of bargaining in all states. The experience in Michigan furnishes ample evidence that public sector bargaining can be satisfactorily
regulated under the private sector concept of the duty to bargain . . . . The
case-by-case decision making approach on mandatory subjects is vastly superior
to a rigid legislative limitation on scope of bargaining.
Edwards, mtpra note 15, at 916.
At the state level, the public employment relations boards and courts in several
states, notably Michigan, New York, Wisconsin and Pennsylvania, have been in
the forefront of the movement toward expanded public sector bargaining.
Id. at 918.
24 It was held discussible in Mississinewa Community Schools Corp. & Mississinewa
Teachers Ass'n, [Impasse Fact-Finding] Case No. F-74-4-2885 (IEERB, July 29, 1974) ;
and Prairie Heights Community School Corp. & Prairie Heights Educ. Ass'n, [Impasse
Fact-Finding] Case No. F-74-57-4515 (IEERB, Aug. 29, 1974). It was held bargainable
in New Prairie United School Corp. & New Prairie Classroom Teachers Ass'n, [Impasse
Fact-Finding] Case No. F-74-35-4805 (IEERB, Aug. 21, 1974) ; and North Knox School
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notes that at its meeting on July 18, 1974, the IEERB issued a statement on this subject indicating that preparation time was discussible."
However, this statement was rescinded in favor of a case by case approach on August 13, 1974, after the two fact-finders who found preparation time to be discussible had relied on it.26 The two fact-finders
who found the subject bargainable apparently ignored the July 18
statement. This inconsistency suggests that the IEERB, its overworked
staff, and its ad hoc employees do not have any extrasensory capacity
in divining the ultimate legal nature of the subjects of the bargaining
process. They undoubtedly would have been pleased to have express
statutory guidance on the scope of bargaining provided by the Act, at
least on the subject of preparation time.
The alleged success of other states in regulating the scope of an
expanded public employee duty to bargain on an ad hoc basis may be
seriously doubted. Professor Edwards notes Pennsylvania as a state
7
in the "forefront" in this regard.
In Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board v. State College Area
School District" the Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board had held 21
disputed subjects not bargainable because they fell within the statutory
prohibition concerning the negotiation of "matters of inherent managerial policy."2 A request for rehearing was filed before the Board in
this case. Subsequently, two Board members were replaced and, upon
rehearing, the Board reversed itself on five of the 21 subjects and noted
that "in a different milieu or context, consistent with this opinion, certain of these [remaining] 16 specifications may tie found to be barCorp. & North Knox Classroom Teachers Ass'n, [Impasse Fact-Finding] Case No. F-7444-4315 (IEERB, Sept 13, 1974).
25 Minutes of the IEERB, July 18, 1974, at 2 (on file with the INDiANA LAW JoUrNAL).
28 Id., Aug. 13, 1974; Id., Nov. 31 & Dec. 12, 1974 (approving hearing examiner's dismissal of unfair labor practice charge in Huntington County Community School Corp. v.
Huntington Community Classroom Teachers Ass'n, [Unfair Practice] Case No. U-74-343625 (IEERB, Sept 23, 1974) and holding preparation time to be discussible as a working condition) (on file with the INDIANA LAW JoURNAL).
27 See note 23 supra.
28 9 Pa. Cmwlth. 229, [State College Educ. Ass'n v. Pennsylvania Lab. Re. Bd.]
306 A.2d 404 (1973). These subjects concerned: instructional materials; planning time;
notice of assignments; desk and locker space; teachers' cafeteria; cocurricular duties;
building assignments; covering for absent teachers; chaperoning athletic events; handling
of supplies; availability of time for Assqciation meetings; access to teachers' *personnel
files; restriction of teachers to school grounds; preparation tine for special teachers;
maximum class size; consultation rights over the school calendar; vacatfon closing time;
scheduling of staff meetings; after-hours meetings with parents; class load; planning
time 2 for
elementary teachers. Id. at 245-46, 306 A.2d at 413-14.
9
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101-701 (Supp. 1974).
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gainable."'
Both the association and the school board appealed this
decision of the Board to a trial court. The trial cotrt affirmed the Board
as to the 16 subjects, holding them nonbargainable, 3 ' and reversed the
Board as to the five subjects it had held bargainable on rehearing. The
intermediate appellate court affirmed the trial court.12 This decision
was issued approximately 27 months after the filing of the initial unfair
labor practice charges on February 26, 1971.
The Pennsylvania experience convincingly illustrates the proposition that statutory certainty with respect to scope of bargaining is far
superior to the uncertainty and delay of ad hoc determination.
Finally, it must be observed that the dual obligation provided in the
Act is responsive to the declared public policy set forth in the Act and
is reasonable as a fair protection of the public at large. To the extent
that the dual obligation operates as a restriction, preventing school board
negotiators from bargaining away the delegated discretion of a school
board, such restriction clearly responds to the policy statement of the
Act in section l(d) 8 and the reservation of management rights provision of section 6(b)." Accordingly, the dual obligation is functioning
as intended by the Indiana legislature.
There is good reason for the restriction provided by the dual obligation. Collective bargaining in the public sector is not the same as collective bargaining in the private sector."' Indeed, it is quite different.
Professor Suminers has analyzed these differences well."' They
are as follows:
First, decisions as to terms and conditions of employment for
public employees are governmental decisions made through the
political process ...
Second, in public employment the employer is the public-in
ultimate political terms, the voters to whom the public officials
30 State College Area School Dist. & State College Educ. Ass'n, [Unfair Practice]
Case No. PERA-C-929-C (Pa. Lab. Rel. Bd., June 26, 1972), excerpted in 464 G.E.R.R.
B-2, B-3 (Current Rep. Aug. 7, 1972).
31 State College Area School Dist. v. Pennsylvania Lab. Rel. Bd. (C.P. Centre
County, Pa., Nov. 7, 1972) (unreported).
s2 Pennsylvania Lab. Rel. Bd. v. State College Area School Dist., 9 Pa. Cmwlth. 229,
[State College Educ. Ass'n v. Pennsylvania Lab. Rel. Bd.] 306 A.2d 404 (1973).
e IND.

CODE

§ 20-7.5-1-1(d) (1973), IND.

ANN. STAT.

§ 28-4551(d) (Supp. 1974).

The language of this section is reproduced in full at note 19 supra.
4 ImND.
CODE

§ 20-7.5-1-6(b) (1973),

IND. ANN. STAT.

§ 28-4556(6) (Supp. 1974).

The language of this section is reproduced at note 20 supra.
s5 WELLINGTON & WINTER, supra note 15, at 202. See also Shaw & Clark, The Prac-

tical Differences Between Public and Private Sector Collective Bargaining, 19 U.C.L.A.L.
REv. 867 (1972).
38 Summers, Public Employee Bargaining: A Political Perspective, 83 YALE L.J.
1156 (1974).
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are responsible. The voters, however, consist largely of two overlapping groups whose interests differ: first, those who use the
employees' services and, second, those who pay for those services
through taxes. ....
Third, the voters who share the employers' economic interests
far outnumber those who share the employees' economic interest.
Fourth, the public employees, even without collective bargaining, can and normally do participate in determining the terms and
conditions of employment. Many can vote and all can support
candidates, organize pressure groups, and present arguments in
the public forum. 7
From the foregoing Professor Summers observes:
From these four characteristics of public employment there emerges
more clearly the central significance of public employee bargaining. Introduction of collective bargaining into the public sector
alters the governmental process, creating within that process
special procedures for making decisions about the wages and
working conditions the public will give its employees.U
There can be little argument with Summers' conclusion.
Now as at no other time in our history, voters are sensitive to special
procedures for governmental decisions which in some way dilute or
replace voters' right to participate, though indirectly, in. those decisions. The citizens of this state are entitled to have that right of political
participation. To the extent a school board and a school employee organization reach an agreement which becomes part of a legally enforceable contract in a process that is not systematically available to all
citizens of the state, there has been a lessening of those citizens' right of
determination of community affairs;8 school employee collective bargaining has replaced or diluted the citizen's right of control over governmental decisions." The task of resolving questions of public policy is
the task of government and should not be undertaken by a collective bar41
gaining relationship.
37 Id. at 1159-60.
a8Id. at 1160.
39 WELLINGTON & WINTER, supra note 15, at 139-40; Note, Determining the Scope of
Bargaining Under the Indiana Education Employment Relatios Act, 49 IND. L.J. 460,

461 (1974),
Placing an agreement in a legally enforceable contract also means that a school
board position is frozen in what may be an area where flexibility is required. Metzler,
The Need for Limitation upon the Scope of Negotiationsin Public Education, , 2 J. LAw
& EDUC. 139, 147 (1973).
40 WELLINGTON & WINTER, supra note 15, at 25; Note, sulra note 39, at 461.
41 Macy, The Role of Bargaining in the Public Service, in PuBLic Woumms AND
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There can be little doubt that absent statutory restrictions, the
scope of bargaining in the public sector will be determined by the same
factors that have long been operative in the private sector, e.g., the
balance of strength or power between unions and employers. 2 This
is a struggle the public must be protected from. This, among other
reasons, is reason enough that the Indiana legislature has included the
dual obligation under sections 3, 4 and 5 of the Act and the reservation of
management rights under section 6(b) ., Such limitation on the.scope
of bargaining should not be broadened or removed. Indiana has struck
a reasonable and workable balance of interests between school employers,
school employee organizations and its citizens. It should and must be
maintained.

APPENDIX

Statement by the Hoosier City Consolidated Contract Team
to the Hoosier City Education Association Contract Team
In today's meeting and perhaps in following meetings, we will be
principally concerned with asking questions and seeking clarification
concerning the proposal which you submitted to us in the last meeting.
We will not be involved in accepting or rejecting any specific matters.
Before asking such questions and seeking such clarification, we
would like to make a rather formal statement concerning that proposal
and all of the meetings which we will have in which we discuss and
11 (S. Zagoria ed. 1972) ; Project, Collective Bargaining and Politics
in Public Employment, 19 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 887, 1011-19 (1972); Goldstein, Book Review,
22 BUFF. L. REv. 603, 604 (1973) :
PUBLIC UNIONS 5,

In terms of public education, collective bargaining must be viewed as a method
of educational decision-making, with teachers viewed as a group competing for
educational decision-making power with such other groups as administrators,
school boards, community leaders, parents, students, legislatures and, indeed,
courts.
See also Summers, supra note 36, at 1195: "Two-sided bargaining on such issues mis-

represents both the range of views and the alignment of interests which should be considered in making the decision."
In response, it has been argued that the teachers, as professionals, should have a
greater voice in these decisions so as to insulate governmental decisionmaking from the
unenlightened public, and to assure that professional judgments will prevail over public
choice. Wollett, The Coming Revolution in Public School Management, 67 MICH. L.
REv. 1017 (1969). Such an argument is seriously defective on its face. See Goldstein,
supra. Even if such professional judgment were crucial, collective bargaining is an extremely inadequate system for delivering it
42 See Note, supra note 39, at 461 n.10. See also Gerhart, The Scope of Bargaining
in Local Government Labor Negotiations, 20 LAB. L.J. 545, 550 (1969).
43 Cf. Note, supra note 39, at 461.
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bargain collectively concerning that proposal and any further proposals
which the Association or the Hoosier City Consolidated School Corporation will make.
As you are aware, under Public Law 217, there are essentially
three (3) different categories of subject which may come up during
negotiations.
Under Section 4 of P.L. 217, there are subjects of bargaining.
These subjects are salary, wages, hours, and salary and wage related
fringe benefits. With regard to such subjects, a school corporation must
bargain collectively.
Under Section 5 of P.L. 217, there are subjects of discussion. Such
subjects include working conditions; curriculum development and revision; textbook selection; teaching methods' selection; assignment or
promotion of personnel; student discipline; expulsion or supervision of
students; pupil-teacher ratio; class size or budget appropriations, as
well as all other matters which are not subjects of bargaining. With
regard to such subjects, a school corporation must discuss them upon
request, but it is not required to and need not bargain collectively,
negotiate or enter into a written contract or be subject to or enter impasse
procedures concerning same unless it expressly agrees to do so.
Under Section 6(b) of P.L. 217, school employers have the responsibility and authority to manage and direct on behalf of the public
the operations and activities of the school corporation to the full extent
authorized by law. Such responsibility and activity includes, but is not
limited to, the right of the employer to:
1.
2.
3.
4.

direct the work of its employees;
establish policy;
hire, promote, demote, transfer, assign and retain employees;
suspend or discharge its employees in accordance with applicable law;
5. maintain the efficiency of school operations;
6. relieve its employees from duties because of lack of work
or other legitimate reason;
7. take actions necessary to carry out the mission of the public
schools as provided by law.
Even if a school employer wished to negotiate concerning these subjects
covered by Section 6(b), it is prohibited by law from doing so.
In short, there are three basic categories:
1. Subjects of bargaining-mattersa school corporation must
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bargain collectively about,
2. Subjects of discussion-matters a school corporation may
discuss, but are not required to bargain collectively about,
and
3. School corporationresponsibilitiesand authorities-matters
which the law prohibits a school corporation from bargaining about or making bargainable.
We are aware that there are some rather subtle differences between
bargaining collectively and discussing. We are also aware that in certain
respects the responsibilities and authorities of the school employer are
intertwined with both subjects of bargaining and subjects of discussion.
Accordingly, it may not always be easy to distinguish between bargainable matters, discussable matters and matters involving the responsibility and authority of the school corporation.
It is our position that we will bargain collectively concerning the
subjects of bargaining. It is also our position that we will discuss, upon
request, those matters which are subjects of discussion, and we will not
agree to make such matters bargainable unless we expressly and unequivocally advise you of our intention to do so. We recognize that much
in the area of discussable subject matter has been covered in the past
by the Personnel Policy Advisory Committee, and we hope that this will
continue. It is also our position that we will in no way contract away,
amend, modify or in any way limit the responsibility and authority of
the school corporation to manage and direct the operations and activities
of the school corporation.
We are also aware that while both of the respective contract teams
are authorized to meet, bargain collectively and discuss the statutorily
authorized subject matters, any agreements reached are expressly subject under Section 2(n) of P.L. 217 to final approval and ratification
by the School Board and the Association.
We recognize that it will be most difficult and time-consuming to
hang name tags on every single matter we discuss in these meetings. For
this reason, we do not intend to hang name tags on every single matter
we discuss in these meetings. However, we want you to be aware of the
fact that we recognize the legal distinctions between these different
categories and the resulting difference in the parties' obligations and
rights with respect to such categories. We also want you to be aware
of the fact that because such matters may be talked about at this table,
for whatever reason, does not mean that we will to any degree and in
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any way waive our rights to recognize the legal distinctions between these
different categories.
It is our intent to harmoniously and expeditiously resolve the issues
that are between us. It is also our intent to retain all of our legal rights
and recognize our legal duties as provided under law, as well as to
recognize and respect all of the Association's legal rights as provided
under law.

